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Abstract
Background: In 2004, patient advocate groups were major players in helping pass and implement significant
public policy and funding initiatives in stem cells and regenerative medicine. In the following years, advocates
were also actively engaged in Washington DC, encouraging policy makers to broaden embryonic stem cell
research funding, which was ultimately passed after President Barack Obama came into office. Many advocates did this
because they were told stem cell research would lead to cures. After waiting more than 10 years, many of these same
patients are now approaching clinics around the world offering experimental stem cell-based interventions instead of
waiting for scientists in the US to complete clinical trials. How did the same groups who were once (and often still are)
the strongest supporters of stem cell research become stem cell tourists? And how can scientists, clinicians,
and regulators work to bring stem cell patients back home to the US and into the clinical trial process?
Discussion: In this paper, we argue that the continued marketing and use of experimental stem cell-based
interventions is problematic and unsustainable. Central problems include the lack of patient protection, US
liability standards, regulation of clinical sites, and clinician licensing. These interventions have insufficient evidence of
safety and efficacy; patients may be wasting money and time, and they may be forgoing other opportunities for an
intervention that has not been shown to be safe and effective. Current practices do not contribute to scientific
progress because the data from the procedures are unsuitable for follow-up research to measure outcomes. In
addition, there is no assurance for patients that they are receiving the interventions promised or of what dosage
they are receiving. Furthermore, there is inconsistent or non-existent follow-up care. Public policy should be
developed to correct the current situation.
Conclusion: The current landscape of stem cell tourism should prompt a re-evaluation of current approaches to
study cell-based interventions with respect to the design, initiation, and conduct of US clinical trials. Stakeholders,
including scientists, clinicians, regulators and patient advocates, need to work together to find a compromise to
keep patients in the US and within the clinical trial process. Using HIV/AIDS and breast cancer advocate cases as
examples, we identify key priorities and goals for this policy effort.
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Background
Significant public debate about stem cell (SC) research
started in 1998 after the first human embryonic SC line
was first successfully grown in a lab [1]. Heated debates
occurred during the presidential elections in 2000 and
2004 about expanding federal funding for embryonic
SC research and increasing the number of embryonic
SC lines eligible for this funding. Scientists strongly ad-
vocating for more funding and less regulation were
joined by a large number of patient advocate groups,
such as the Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation
(JDRF) and the Michael J. Fox Foundation for Parkinson’s
disease. Numerous grassroots organizations joined the ef-
forts as well as business leaders such as Robert Klein,
whose efforts in California helped pass Proposition 71 that
created the California Institute of Regenerative Medicine
(CIRM). Scientists and patient advocates promoted the re-
search and therapeutic potential of all SC types to treat
debilitating diseases. Media coverage regularly extolled the
promises of SC research [2].
Unfortunately, the growing publicity on the field had
negative consequences—unproven SC-based interven-
tion (SCBI) clinics flourished. Starting in the mid-2000s,
clinics began exploiting the popularity of SCs to market
and selling SCBIs which have not undergone clinical tri-
als. Clinics emerged claiming to cure diseases ranging
from autism to multiple sclerosis [3–5]. While some pa-
tients find clinics within the US offering unproven
SCBIs, many travel abroad, often to countries with less
developed medical infrastructures and regulatory over-
sight, a concept or practice often referred to as SC
tourism.
Patients frustrated by what they saw as the slow pro-
gress of science and desperate for a cure began paying for
access to unproven interventions despite strong discour-
agement from scientists and doctors [3, 6–9]. Although
clinical trials utilizing SCs have increased, the majority are
still in the safety-testing stage involving a limited number
of patients [10]. And many patients have conditions that
are not part of a current SC trial. Other patients want
more than research; they hope for a cure or at least an
opportunity for some improvement now [9]. Clinic adver-
tisements successfully use a “rhetoric of hope” to appeal
to patients, and patients respond positively when probed
by researchers saying the experience increases their happi-
ness and hope in the future [9]. Even more shocking is
that many SC tourism patients are minors, under the age
of 18 (more than 40 % by some calculations) who had
limited ability to participate in the decision-making
process [7, 8]. Although we cannot know truly what is
being offered by which clinics and the number of patients
who travel to obtain SCBIs, there is evidence that SC tour-
ism is a substantial and increasing industry [5, 11–14].
And it is still increasing, despite efforts to combat it [15].
As early as 2008, scientists and policy scholars became
concerned about the negative impact these clinics would
have on patients as well as the field [16–19]. For patients
seeking SCBIs, the costs and risks associated with SC
tourism are significant [3]. The average cost is $47,000
per treatment, but clinics charge from $3500–$400,000,
and often require travel, which adds to the expense [20].
If patients are harmed from the procedure, it is unclear
in the US whether or not third party payers will cover
the cost of treating side-effects [21].
Patients seeking unproven SCBIs may not be ad-
equately informed about the risks associated with
these interventions and the very limited prospect of
benefit [22–24]. In fact, opinion polls indicate the
public believes the benefits outweigh perceived risks
[25]. Patients’ hope for improvement may be a power-
ful factor in decision making and they may not be
dissuaded by information about the lack of safety and
efficacy data [8, 26, 27]. Clinics in the US most com-
monly offer treatments related to pain management
or improved healing of an existing injury although
there is no strong scientific evidence that these treat-
ments are beneficial [28]. Clinics overseas offer more
extensive interventions, culturing autologous SCs or
even injecting human embryonic SCs. As a result,
several patients have developed serious conditions or
died from unregulated procedures. An Israeli boy with
a rare genetic brain disease developed tumors after
obtaining fetal SC injections in Russia and a girl treated in
Costa Rica for multiple sclerosis experienced catastrophic
demyelinating encephalomyelitis following a stem cell
transplantation [29, 30]. A woman with lupus nephritis
died in 2010 after receiving a SC procedure in Bangkok
[31]. And a clinic in Germany, XCell Center, was shut
down after the death of a Romanian baby after SC injec-
tions into the brain [32].
It is often unclear, even to the patients, what cells are
being provided, if the procedure has been standardized
and what effects it has in both the short- and long-
term. This can render patients ineligible to receive
other treatments or participate in future clinical re-
search [23]. The lack of follow-up post-treatment also
makes it impossible to identify long-term risks. Provid-
ing unproven SCBIs without adhering to a protocol and
systematically collecting data leaves scientists and the
public with little to no useful new knowledge about the
safety and efficacy of these interventions and under-
mines the interests of future patients [22]. Even when
clinics claim to be conducting research, the rigor and
reliability of their data are questionable [24]. Most
clinics offer testimonials by alleged patients and clinic
representatives as data, which do not provide reliable evi-
dence necessary to advance the field [5]. SC tourism un-
dermines the interest of future patients causing research
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to be less rigorous; when widespread early access to treat-
ments is provided patients are less likely to participate in
trials [23, 33].
It also is difficult for patients to receive proper medical
attention after a SCBI since the nature of their original
treatment might be unknown. Furthermore, most clinics
are located in countries where standards for patient care
are below what US patients expect and where patients
lack protections afforded by liability standards and other
requirements that are standard in the US [5].
One of the major science organizations, the Inter-
national Society for Stem Cell Research (ISSCR), devel-
oped guidelines to distance the scientific community
and SC research from clinics offering unproven and un-
regulated SCBIs. Developed in 2008 with an updated
draft circulating for comment in 2015, these guidelines
support the traditional clinical trial regulatory and eth-
ical oversight process and make recommendations on
how scientists should translate research into the clinic
regardless of the country where their research is being
conducted [16, 34]. Researchers, bioethicists, physi-
cians, funders and regulators are concerned that the
safety and efficacy of SCBIs remain unknown. They also
note that the procedures are not well-documented and
there is a lack of transparency regarding what patients
receive. Furthermore, scientists worry that fraudulent
clinics will negatively impact the reputation of the field,
much like they worry that scientific misconduct will
harm public perception of science [35-37]. If patients
are harmed, regulators and the public might link nega-
tive consequences to SC and regenerative medicine re-
search, threatening funding and perhaps leading to
further restrictions on such research.
In the US, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
regulates clinical trials and approves drugs, biologics, and
medical devices, among other things [37]. The FDA’s role
in the emergence of SC tourism is complex [33]. In the
early days of debates regarding SCBIs, it was unclear
whether the FDA had regulatory authority over autolo-
gous SCBIs, which typically involve using the patient’s
own cells from one site, such as bone marrow or adipose
tissue, and injecting them into the location of the diseased
or injured tissue [28]. These procedures make up the
majority of SCBIs offered in US clinics. The FDA’s author-
ity was debated because the donor and recipient were the
same person [38]. Some advocates argued that a patient’s
own cells should not be considered drugs or biologics
subject to FDA oversight; their use should be “treated as a
medical practice” and left to the discretion of physicians
[22]. They described the idea of FDA regulating autolo-
gous SC interventions as “your cells = drugs” and decried
it as illogical as well as fatal for innovation.
The FDA asserted its authority and investigated clinics
that offered SCBIs which utilized more than “minimally
manipulated” cells [38]. This included autologous proce-
dures, especially if the cells were processed and ex-
panded in culture. The disputes between the FDA and
clinics offering these services led to the defining case,
United States v Regenerative Sciences LLC (Regenexx)
[39]. The DC Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the
“Regenexx procedure,” an intervention which involved
culturing and expanding a patient’s autologous SCs be-
fore reimplantation, was subject to FDA regulation
(Regenexx.com). The court found that the procedure in-
volved more than “minimal manipulation” of the cells
and the company “violated federal laws regulating the
manufacture and labeling of drugs and biological prod-
ucts by producing, as part of their medical practice, a
substance consisting of a mixture of a patient’s SCs and
the antibiotic doxycycline” [39].
Many scientists considered this ruling an important
step toward ensuring that only safe and effective SCBIs
are offered to patients [40]. The court decision led to
the shut-down of many US SCBI clinics, although some
still are open [28]. Unfortunately, rather than prompting
clinical research and widespread efforts to demonstrate
safety and efficacy of SCBIs through clinical trials, the
ruling drove, more than ever, providers and patients to
SC tourism. The FDA only regulates products and their
uses in the US, so several clinics relocated to countries
without strict oversight of cell-based therapies. For
example, Regenexx provides their cultured SC proced-
ure in the Cayman Islands and another clinic, Preci-
sion Stem Cell, recruits in the US for a Colombian
clinic [28, 40]. SC tourism is especially prevalent in
Latin America, Asia and the Caribbean [22].
The current landscape in which patients travel to
unregulated clinics outside of the US to obtain un-
proven SCBIs poses a number of serious concerns for
individual patients as well as for society, particularly
for future patients. In this paper, we argue that public
policy should be developed to reduce SC tourism.
Policy should be aimed at bringing patients home and
fostering responsible scientific research as well as ac-
cess for patients. This will require discussions about
alternative approaches to the design and conduct of
clinical trials as well as to how interventions are ap-
proved by FDA.
SCs and regenerative medicine were not the first areas
of medical research to be seen pitting advocates, who
wanted widespread access to experimental interven-
tions, against scientists and regulators, who wanted to
evaluate the safety and efficacy of these interventions
before making them widely available. Two examples
with different policy responses and outcomes were
HIV/AIDS activists in the 1980s and breast cancer
advocates in the 1990s. Using these cases as exam-
ples, we identify key priorities and goals for the SC
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tourism policy effort and essential steps in the policy
development process.
Discussion
HIV/AIDS and breast cancer advocacy
The struggle between patients and regulators is not
unique to SC research. HIV/AIDS activism in the 1980s
and breast cancer activism in the 1990s reflect discon-
nects that can occur in medicine between patients’ de-
sires for access to new interventions and scientists,
regulators or third party payers trying to make sure in-
terventions are safe and effective prior to widespread
marketing and use. In these two examples, advocates
sought to obtain access to therapies prior to the com-
pletion of clinical trials, while regulators and third party
payers asked for patience. Each secured early access but
it did not necessarily result in the best outcomes for the
patients. Important differences between them should in-
form the policy approach to address SC tourism.
In the 1980s, HIV/AIDS was a devastating disease,
killing millions worldwide [41]. Desperate for a treat-
ment, AIDS activists argued that the FDA approval
process was too long and inappropriate for fatal condi-
tions such as AIDS. At the time, the FDA had informal
programs that allowed some patients access to investi-
gational new drugs (INDs). AIDS activists pushed the
FDA to formalize these programs. First, the 1987
changes to the IND program established mechanisms
by which patients could obtain INDs outside of clinical
trials [42]. Then, the 1988 fast-track initiative allowed
for expedited approval of some drugs for conditions
such as AIDS. In 1990, the parallel track program
allowed HIV/AIDS patients who could not enroll in
clinical trials access to experimental drugs [43]. In
addition, in 1992 the FDA allowed the use of surrogate
endpoints as a basis for drug approval to accelerate the
process [33]. Surrogate endpoints are alternative mea-
sures which correlate with the outcome that is of pri-
mary interest but can be measured more readily. An
example of a surrogate endpoint is tumor shrinkage ra-
ther than longer survival. How confident we must be
that a surrogate endpoint is a valid substitute for the
endpoint of primary interest is debated [44, 45].
These policy changes were prompted by direct activ-
ism, including protests in front of FDA headquarters
[33]. Activists were aware that drugs were being ap-
proved abroad, especially in Japan, and found ways to
import and distribute them to AIDS patients in the US
[46]. Patients enrolled in clinical trials would use other
experimental agents acquired outside of studies while in
trials and they sometimes shared study pills, compromis-
ing data integrity [47]. These factors helped encourage
changes within the FDA to promote research while fa-
cilitating access.
A second example of a disconnect between scientists,
patients and regulators revolved around access to and
insurance coverage for high dose chemotherapy (HDC)
and autologous bone marrow transplantation (ABMT)
to treat metastatic breast cancer in the 1990s. HDC/
ABMT had not been proven to be safe and effective for
breast cancer, but it had been used successfully in other
types of cancers and preliminary studies suggested it
might be effective in breast cancer. Patients and oncol-
ogists were eager to try this intervention despite its
high cost and lack of evidence [48, 49].
Unlike the early HIV/AIDS medications, the drugs
here were approved, albeit for other uses. The advo-
cates were not fighting the FDA for access [50]. In-
stead they were trying to get third party payers to
cover the treatment. Initially, many third party payers,
both private insurance companies and government
programs, refused coverage because it was experimen-
tal. To gain access, patients and families headed to
court, suing insurance companies to demand coverage
or to recover damages when patients died after having
been denied coverage for HDC/ABMT [43]. Results
varied, but many third party payers began covering
HDC/ABMT for women with advanced breast cancer
as a result of the litigation [50, 52, 53].
In part as a result of the successful demands for
coverage outside of clinical trials and the perception
among some patients and oncologists that HDC/ABMT
was an appropriate treatment for metastatic breast can-
cer, it took an inordinate amount of time to complete
the randomized controlled trials that evaluated the
safety and efficacy of the intervention. Patients wanted
to receive treatment, not risk being in the control
group of a trial. Study results eventually showed that
HDC/ABMT did not improve survival and in some
cases led to decreased life-span and increased discom-
fort compared to standard treatment [54, 55]. Not only
did patients pursue an ineffective intervention at great
expense to third party payers, but in some cases the
intervention caused them more harm.
Lessons from HIV/AIDS and breast cancer
Advocate movements to facilitate access to experimental
interventions for HIV/AIDS and breast cancer contain
lessons that should inform patients, SC advocates, scien-
tists, and regulators thinking about SC tourism. While the
HIV/AIDS and breast cancer case studies focus on one
disease, SCs are being utilized to treat a broad range of
medical conditions. Moreover, unlike the HDC/ABMT
(but like the HIV/AIDS) case, SC tourism involves many
different interventions. Despite any differences, learning
from previous activist movements and policy responses
can help guide us in thinking about how to address SC
tourism.
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The AIDS activists collaborated effectively with cli-
nicians, scientists and regulators to improve policies
at the FDA. They found ways to improve the system
but still worked with the system. The FDA listened
and acknowledged the values, priorities and goals of
the activist groups. The resulting compromises in
FDA regulations allowed HIV/AIDS scientists and
clinical researchers to continue to evaluate potential
medications for safety and efficacy, while patients ob-
tained early access. Measures were in place to collect
data over the long-term to meet the societal interest
in ensuring the safety and efficacy of drugs marketed
and sold in the US. Rather than ignoring advocates’
pleas, the FDA collaborated with multiple stake-
holders to develop policies that would address the in-
terests of different stakeholders. As a result, they
compromised and developed a series of policies to
allow quicker access to patients while still honoring
the research process. In addition to conducting stud-
ies that did not use placebo controls, other compro-
mises included the use of surrogate endpoints, such
as reduced CD4 counts, and early termination of
studies based on preliminary data [56, 57].
One negative result of these compromises, which
should be acknowledged in developing SC policy, was
that after access to experimental drugs was granted,
many of the clinical studies were less rigorous [58].
Because of the deadly nature of the disease, patients
did not want to risk receiving a placebo or standard-
of-care, which were not very effective. Therefore en-
rollment in trials decreased taking longer to finish the
studies. This reflected a balancing of interests and
priorities. But these outcomes were an improvement
over the previous situation where untested drugs were
being used by patients and experimental pills were
being shared, compromising clinical trial data integrity.
Ultimately, a collaborative approach was essential in
HIV/AIDS to advance the different goals of patient
advocates, scientists, clinicians and regulators. The
compromise overall improved outcomes and reduced
harm. While the revised policy might not have been
perfect, it was better than a one-sided approach that
ignored the interests and priorities of patients. This
type of approach would likely have resulted in pa-
tients continuing to seek unproven treatments, com-
promising studies and putting patients at more risk
over the long-term.
Unfortunately, the activism around HDC/ABMT for
advanced breast cancer did not have similarly positive
results and caused more harm than benefit to patients.
Favorable court reaction to desperately ill patients, their
families, and physicians is understandable. Powerful
forces, including the media and lobbying groups, lined
up behind patients, often young women, whose stories
were compelling [50-52, 58]. The presumption that
HDC/ABMT was beneficial shaped much of the public
discourse even though it still was unproven [55]. Scientists
argued that it was not yet possible to establish the
safety and efficacy of HDC/ABMT for advanced breast
cancer because more evidence was needed. The courts,
on the other hand, held that it was necessary to decide
the cases before them using the currently available evi-
dence, which was based on positive results of the ther-
apy in other cancers. Differences in how scientists and
courts approve and use evidence to make decisions are
well documented [59]. Although the courts were incon-
sistent, in many cases the plaintiffs won the sympathy
of judges and juries, and fear of litigation led others to
cover HDC/ABMT [60]. The scientists, clinicians, regu-
lators and advocates failed to work together to com-
promise on a policy which would have accelerated
testing of HDC/ABMT and thereby prevented some of
its unnecessary use.
In the end, the HDC/ABMT court rulings harmed pa-
tients who received the intervention, led more patients
to receive the intervention than would have received it
had randomized controlled trials been completed in a
timely fashion, delayed answering questions about the
safety and efficacy of HDC/ABMT, and cost significant
amounts of money [54].
The similarities between HDC/ABMT treatments for
breast cancer and SCBIs are striking and could predict
the future. Neither intervention requires access to
drugs from pharmaceutical companies. Everything is
available to clinicians and patients. SC tourism advo-
cates have not yet started using the courts to secure
coverage for unproven interventions. Unfortunately, the
fact that many patients are obtaining unproven SCBIs
abroad rather than participating in the process of gen-
erating new knowledge about the safety and efficacy of
these interventions through clinical trials poses the
same kinds of risks to patients and society as did the
pursuit of HDC/ABMT for advanced breast cancer.
These patients are circumventing the scientific process
of evaluating the safety and efficacy of new interven-
tions. Even if they perceive a positive change in their
condition, their treatment outcomes cannot be used to
determine safety and efficacy because the procedure is
not well-documented and there are no controls or long
term evaluations.
SC scientists worry about the impact granting ac-
cess to unproven treatments may have on the field,
especially philanthropic efforts to fund research. In
addition, with limited resources including time and
funding, scientists are cautious about testing therapies
where the preliminary data are limited and not very
encouraging. Many worry that if they had ready ac-
cess to unproven interventions, patients would, like
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HIV/AIDS and HDC/ABMT patients did, avoid clin-
ical trials with the chance of getting standard care or
a placebo. Unfortunately, unproven SCBIs are being
marketed and used, particularly through SC tourism.
Providing the kind of access may render it very diffi-
cult to pursue clinical trials.
Addressing SC tourism through policy change
The practice of more and more patients with debilitat-
ing illnesses going abroad to less developed medical in-
frastructures to seek SCBIs raises serious problems that
should be addressed as a matter of public policy. Since
2008, scientists have worked to educate the public
about the risks associated with receiving unproven
SCBIs. But this seems to have had little impact on what
appears to be a growing market [15]. Other education
efforts to change behavior and opinion related to medical
interventions, such as vaccinations, also have had little
effect [61]. In fact, initial research found that patients
were wary of researchers and regulatory systems within
their countries—a barrier which cannot be overcome by
educational materials from these institutions [26].
Fixing the broken system requires more than education.
Educational efforts to combat SC tourism for patients
and clinicians should continue and be strengthened,
but alone they are unlikely to be sufficient, largely be-
cause of the power of hope [9, 26, 27]. The develop-
ment of adequate policies and regulations to connect,
acknowledge and recognize the interests of the stake-
holders—the patients, the researchers, the regulators,
and the investors—is required. If SC tourism is not
addressed as a collaborative effort, policy could be de-
veloped through the courts. Unfortunately judges and
juries have limited scientific knowledge, different obliga-
tions and goals than policy makers, and a propensity to be
swayed by persuasive and emotional arguments.
We introduced two examples in which advocates
sought access to unproven interventions. These situa-
tions highlight how different approaches to patient ad-
vocates can lead to better or worse outcomes for all
parties. An appropriate and thoughtful policy response
that advances multiple competing goals is needed. This
insight leads to several questions regarding SC tourism:
How is an effective policy response developed? How
can we engage patients eager to seek unproven SCBIs
outside of US clinical trials and the US health care sys-
tem, as well as clinicians and scientists eager to study
and provide these interventions to develop an effective
response to SC tourism? How can policy move from a
one-size-fits-all approach to medical regulation to an
approach that acknowledges differences among inter-
ventions as well as the conditions of patients/research
participants? We begin by articulating the principles
and goals that should guide policy development and
then discuss factors impacting policy development, in-
cluding the ability to engage stakeholders and create
compromise.
Principles for developing policy
SC tourism can be viewed as a unique issue, but many
of the specific ethical and regulatory concerns are simi-
lar if not the same as other areas of clinical research,
such as the HIV/AIDS and breast cancer cases. When
developing public policy, four general principles—that
can apply more broadly to biomedical research as
well—should be considered: respecting the patient, pro-
tecting public health, fostering trust in health institu-
tions, and promoting rigorous clinical research. While
these could be applied to developing any health-related
policy, we note special considerations related to SCBIs.
First, the policy should respect the interests of ser-
iously ill patients and the authority of individuals to
make decisions about what choices are reasonable for
them. The interest of the state to restrict access to ex-
perimental interventions competes with the interest of
patients to pursue possible treatment. This is particularly
true for patients with serious or fatal conditions for
whom no effective treatments are available.
In developing policy regarding SCBIs, this could
mean, for instance, assessing trials and access to in-
terventions for patients with debilitating or fatal dis-
eases differently from others. The interest of future
patients should not be favored over those of current
patients facing serious or catastrophic disease [62].
Changes to current regulatory policy might include
granting more people access to interventions earlier in
the trial process, but preventing any access outside of
rigorous studies. Alternatively, new regulation could
allow studies to move from phase 0 or 1 to phase 2
earlier. Perhaps the FDA could even allowing marketing
of therapies earlier, similar to the new policy Japan
where SCBI can be marketed during the phase 3 trials
[63]. The FDA also might consider initiating clinical
trials with less preliminary data, considering different
study designs from those typically employed, or utiliz-
ing trial designs that avoid ineffective standard treat-
ment arms.
For instance, in 2014 during the Ebola epidemic in
Africa, the need to design studies to evaluate both
preventative measures and treatments for Ebola gen-
erated significant discussion over appropriate trial de-
sign. Issues explored included the pros and cons of
different designs, such as randomized controlled tri-
als, cluster randomized controlled trials, and studies
that use different types of controls, as well as how to
identify control groups [64–67]. The scientific merit
of different designs is an important consideration, as
is the effect different designs have on the willingness
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of patients and health care professionals to participate
and to trust the research process [68].
Second, the policy should protect the health and
safety of individuals as well as the public. Achieving
this goal involves both facilitating access to promising
therapies and preventing access to unsafe ones. Pro-
viding patients with interventions, including SCBIs,
whose safety and efficacy are unknown puts patients
at risk of harm and can lead to a waste of resources.
Policy efforts should not treat unproven SCBIs as
anything other than experimental interventions. Policy
efforts should aim to prevent possible harms and facilitate
research that can lead to advances promoting health and
efficiency. Therefore, a policy should maximize potential
benefit and minimize risks to patients and society. This is
an accepted requirement in clinical research [69].
The recent court case Abigail Alliance for Better
Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach and
current push for state “Right to Try” laws highlight
the tension between the first and second goals. In the
Abigail Alliance case the Courts ultimately disagreed,
but the Alliance argued that terminally ill patients
have a privacy and liberty interest in accessing experi-
mental drugs and that government interference with
such access violates patients’ constitutional rights [70].
In response to the loss in the courts, advocates fo-
cused their attention on state legislatures by promot-
ing “Right to Try” laws, which allow terminally ill
patients access to experimental therapies after they
have passed phase 1 trials [71].
Other advocates have offered autonomy-based argu-
ments supporting the right of individuals to be free of
FDA interference [27, 72]. But the individual’s right
may be tempered by a compelling state interest. The
state’s interests identified typically involve protecting
people from using harmful products in light of the lim-
ited information the consumer might have about a
product [73]. Whether such a compelling state interest
exists is debated [74]. Policy developed to address SC
tourism must reflect an appreciation of this tension.
A third goal is to promote well-placed trust in phy-
sicians and health care institutions. Trust in the
physician-patient relationship is important because it
is necessary for an effective therapeutic alliance [75].
As such, “preserving, justifying, and enhancing trust
is the fundamental goal of much of medical ethics,
and is a prominent objective in health care law and
public policy” [75]. The need for consumers to be
able to rely on the information they receive about
medications shapes FDA requirements for truth in ad-
vertising. These restrictions limit what companies
may assert about their products [76]. This helps to
promote trust and gives patients assurance that the
claims made by companies are supported by evidence.
But the FDA could do more to police these websites
by engaging the public in their efforts with easy and
anonymous online reporting of fraudulent clinics and
websites.
In addition to the company websites and advertise-
ments, physicians need to be aware of the problem
and risks associated with recommending unproven
SCBIs. This is especially true of the celebrity doctors,
who make health recommendation with little to no
scientific data to back them up [77]. Policing doctors’
practice is traditionally the role of state licensing
boards, but policy makers have started to review the
problem even calling a celebrity doctor in front of
Congress to defend his on camera comments related
to health products [78].
Finally, policy should promote ethical and rigorous
scientific research. The importance of the ethical con-
duct of research is widely recognized [79–81]. Policy
should also promote scientific progress or at least not
impede it unless necessary for public safety. It should
protect research from inappropriate influences and
biases. Moreover, “science policy should support the
needs of citizens” [62, 82]. Whatever policy is devel-
oped, it has to ensure data validity and integrity.
Without reliable data, people remain at risk, science
does not advance, money and other resources are
wasted, and effective treatments will remain elusive.
Requiring a system for thorough documentation through-
out the SCBI research process, including follow-up
post-treatment evaluation will facilitate long-term pro-
gress in identifying risks and increasing efficacy. If
changes are made to make allowances for earlier ac-
cess to SCBIs, this must be done in connection with
continued rigorous research to determine the efficacy
and safety of the intervention.
Advancing these four goals will help create a stron-
ger, more effective policy that reflects stakeholder
needs and priorities. Policy proposals should acknow-
ledge these goals and be tested against them. This is
challenging both because of the tensions among these
principles and because policies adopted in the US
only shape US practices. SC tourism is evidence of
the problems that emerge when different practices
and policies prevail in different areas. While inter-
national organizations, such as ISSCR, continue to
discuss and pass guidelines which prohibit the use of
SCBIs outside of a clinical trial, they are non-binding
and cannot force clinics to close.
Compromises will most likely be needed to obtain
the necessary data to refute or validate claims of
SCBI clinics and hopefully in the long run help pro-
mote public and individual health. But making these
compromising could impact the quality of research in
the short term.
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Factors to develop solutions
A SC tourism policy solution should integrate the de-
sire to innovate and to provide and receive experi-
mental interventions with the need to pursue research
and evaluate safety and efficacy. The FDA response to
SC tourism needs to involve engaging stakeholders,
especially patient advocates, scientists, regulators, and
clinicians, in robust consultation processes. In those
processes, the priorities and concerns of each group
should be identified and various types of changes
should be considered. From what we know now, the
underlying reasons for SC tourism include frustration,
desperation, varying accounts of truth, and hope [9, 27].
Patient advocates, scientists, regulators, and clinicians
have competing interests and goals [64]. Part of the
stakeholder engagement process should focus on over-
coming these obstacles and identifying common goals
and ways to achieve them.
The idea of engaging stakeholders to advance science
and solve problems is not new. The National Institutes
of Health (NIH) has established community engage-
ment and community engaged research as priorities in
multiple ways [83]. Much can be learned from these ef-
forts to include stakeholders in identifying research
questions, designing and conducting studies, and inter-
preting and disseminating data. Methods developed to
engage stakeholders by NIH and NIH-funded scientists
and others can be adopted to develop a policy response
to SC tourism. Methods used in Patient-Centered Out-
comes Research Institute (PCORI) studies might be espe-
cially useful [84]. These include the use of stakeholder
panels to identify research priorities and aims; to con-
tribute to and evaluate study design; to develop com-
munication materials such as consent forms; to assess
research risks and burdens and propose ways to miti-
gate these; to evaluate the information that should be
communicated to participants during and after a trial,
to create decision aids, and to address problems or
questions that emerge during a study.
Other examples of ways to engage stakeholders in-
clude stakeholder-specific in-person and virtual town
hall meetings and focus groups. Such gatherings may
be aimed at identifying priorities and concerns, gener-
ating new policy or other ideas, and evaluating exist-
ing ideas for policy change [84]. The Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation also has developed community
engagement resources that could be adapted to address SC
tourism [85]. These include community boards that par-
ticipate actively in identifying problems, crafting policies
and interventions to address those problems, and
implementing and evaluating changes. It might also
be appropriate to ask groups to generate white papers
or other documents that can help advance the con-
versation. Bringing stakeholder groups together for
dialogue may facilitate creative and effective solutions.
One model for achieving this is the Bob Woodruff
Foundation’s High Impact Collaboration Series, which
is designed to identify specific problems and solutions
by bringing together key stakeholders and contribu-
tors who can promote effective changes [86]. Another
way to establish consensus within and across stake-
holder groups is the use of Delphi panels [87] Delphi
panels could be used to rank research priorities, or
identify the most acceptable compromises or study
designs.
Knowledge and new insights gained from stakeholder
engagement should inform policy development. An-
other group of stakeholders who should be consulted
included representatives from clinics offering unproven
SCBIs. While some clinics may not be trustworthy and
some may have no interest in participating in the clin-
ical trial process, others could be encouraged to initiate
a form of a trial to collect data in a manner that is still
overseen or regulated by the FDA. The FDA should
work to integrate (some) clinics offering unproven in-
terventions and procedures so data can be collected
into a form of clinical trials [23, 88]. But this requires
changes in FDA policies. Many innovative SCBIs lack
data—positive or negative. Currently, the FDA requires
that investigators and companies demonstrate that they
have sufficient information “to assure the safety and
rights of subjects” (21CFR312B.22(a)) to justify human
testing. So, while they are subject to FDA oversight and
their products require FDA approval, many SCBI clinics
cannot obtain permission from the FDA to initiate tri-
als. This has led patients and doctors in some cases to
move clinics outside of US so they can continue the in-
terventions. If the FDA maintains its current position,
people will continue to obtain unproven SCBIs outside
of US and the effectiveness of interventions will con-
tinue to be unknown.
We should be wary about making any radical policy
changes to the FDA clinical trial and approval process.
Expanding FDA clinical trials needs to be done carefully.
Access to untested interventions could result in harm in-
cluding unfinished clinical trials (because patients are un-
willing to volunteer), less rigorous trials and overall harm
for society. Furthermore, some critics note that the FDA is
not well suited to oversee SCBIs because cells differ in
multiple ways from drugs and biologics FDA policies were
designed to regulate. SCBIs use cells which are not cleared
from the body like drugs are and the interventions used
are often patient-specific. But the FDA has a long his-
tory of adapting to new technologies and already has
been developing pathways for regulating personalized
medicine interventions including drugs for specific
disease-causing mutations (such as Kalydeco) and au-
tologous vaccines (such as Provenge) [89].
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Any regulatory approaches developed to address SC
tourism must be clear and transparent [90]. And they
must be designed in a way that recognizes that not
all innovative interventions turn out to be safe and
effective treatments. It is problematic to assume that
everything new is good or at least will not be harm-
ful, or that something always is better than nothing.
New regulatory approaches also should be evaluated
to determine whether they are effective. Metrics to
evaluate new and existing policies should be identified
and employed in policy assessment. This can include
evaluating completion of clinical trials, effectiveness
of SCBIs, the extent to which SC tourism decreases,
and necessity of the policy if it’s determined that the
SCBIs are unsafe or ineffective.
Conclusion
In 2004, patient advocate groups were major players
in helping implement and pass significant public pol-
icy and funding initiatives in SCs and regenerative
medicine. In the following years, advocates encour-
aged policy makers to broaden embryonic SC research
funding, which was ultimately passed after President
Barack Obama came into office in 2009. Many advo-
cates did this because they were told SC research
would lead to cures. After waiting more than 10 years,
many of these same patients are going to clinics
around the world offering experimental SCBIs against
the advice of the majority of doctors and SC scientists.
A policy intervention to reduce SC tourism is needed.
It must address the needs and concerns of the major
stakeholders: patient advocates, researchers, clinicians,
and regulators. It should be an evidence-based policy,
i.e., one grounded in an understanding of the compet-
ing interests and priorities at stake and in an analysis of
the effects of different approaches. Metrics for evaluat-
ing the success of these policies should be established
in advance and data gathered over time. Policies should
be changed if found ineffective.
It remains to be seen what would be the best and
be most appropriate model for addressing SC tourism.
Nevertheless, change is needed. Previous ways advo-
cates pushed for change, with both positive and nega-
tive results for the patients, can help guide how SC
tourism is approached by US policy makers. Working
as a group to formulate a compromise policy address-
ing the needs of different stakeholders will be the
only way to curb the growing and disturbing trend of
SC tourism.
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